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In Italy, for 30 years under the Borgias, they had warfare, ter-
ror, murder and bloodshed, but they produced Michelangelo,
Leonardo da Vinci and the Renaissance. In Switzerland, they
had brotherly love; they had 500 years of democracy and peace
and what did that produce? The cuckoo clock. So long, Holly.'
I. Introduction
A nation's art is important because it mirrors the country's peo-
ple and history. Fine art is the only exported product of a country
that remains in its original condition. Scientific discoveries are dupli-
cated; musical compositions are interpreted and altered. The work of
Pasteur and Beethoven belong to the world not just to their home
countries of France and Austria, whereas works of art are original
and unique unto the artist's own hand. This uniqueness gives art its
important place in a nation's heritage.
Uniqueness also gives art a high price tag and a high demand.
The demand is not, however, limited to legitimate purchases but ex-
tends into a profitable market of stolen art works. In recent years,
the record number of paintings and other works of art that have
been stolen has reached critical levels. Last year alone there were
over 5000 pieces of art reported stolen to the International Founda-
tion for Art Research (IFAR), an organization which compiles infor-
mation on stolen art.' However, this number does not include art
that may have been plundered from remote archaeological sites and
1. The Third Man (Selznick-London Films 1949).
2. Telephone interview with Dr. Constance Lowenthal, Executive Director, International
Foundation for Art Research (November 2, 1989) [hereinafter Lowenthal Interview]. " 'Sto-
len' means acquired, or possessed, as a result of some wrongful or dishonest act or taking,
whereby a person willfully obtains or retains possession of property which belongs to another,
without or beyond any permission given, and with the intent to deprive the owner of the benefit
of ownership." United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1974). Art theft
has become so lucrative that it is second only to narcotics among illegal businesses. Boston
Globe, Feb. 12, 1989, Magazine at 16.
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which have not yet been discovered as missing.' Interpol keeps a rec-
ord of stolen art but it is estimated that it contains only about one-
third of the art that is actually stolen." To add to the difficulty of
recording the total amount of stolen art, only about thirty percent of
the objects stolen have been actually photographed, making a posi-
tive identification of the object, if found, almost impossible.6 Coun-
tries which demand that national treasures be returned are often
Third World states that were pilfered and looted by colonial or in-
vading forces in the early twentieth century. World Wars I and II
forced many private collectors to hide their works and much of that
art was discovered and stolen or destroyed.'
Only a small fraction of antiquities are moved legally. The large
majority of artifacts are excavated, transported, and sold illegally.'
There are two primary ways in which art is moved illegally in inter-
national trade: Art can be taken by a person holding good title from
a country in violation of that country's export laws or it may be sto-
len and smuggled out of the country.8 The former movement is not
actionable in United States courts since United States customs laws
do not restrict the importation of art that has been illegally exported
from another country.9 The only exceptions to this rule of non-prose-
cution are the treaties between the United States and Mexico1" and
the United States and Peru1" in which the United States agreed to
respect the export laws of these countries.
This Comment will explore the remedies currently available to
foreign countries and to individuals who have discovered that works
stolen from them are in the possession of American museums, art
dealers, and private individuals. It will also explain why, in light of
the recent decision of Autocephalous v. Goldberg,1" civil sanctions
are the best means to effect the return of stolen art as well as to help
deter future buyers of stolen art, thus shrinking the stolen art
3. Lowenthal Interview, supra note 2.
4. B. BURNHAM, THE ART CRISIS 27 (1975).
5. Id.
6. Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and Feldman Fine
Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1379 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
7. Fishman & Metzger, Protecting America's Cultural and Historical Patrimony, 4
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 51, 77 (1976).
8. P. BATOR, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ART 10 (198 1) (originally appeared as An
Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275 (1982)).
9. Id. at 11.
10. Treaty of Cooperation Between the United States of America and the United Mexi-
can States Providing for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical and
Cultural Properties, July 17, 1970, United States-Mexico, 22 U.S.T. 494, T.I.A.S. No. 7088
[hereinafter United States-Mexico Treaty].
II. Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Peru for the
Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cultural Property, Sept. 15,
1985, -United States-Peru, 33 U.S.T. 1607, T.I.A.S. No. 10136 [hereinafter United States-
Peru Treaty].
12. 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
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market.
There are three avenues for recovery: The National Stolen
Property Act; treaties similar to the ones the United States has with
Mexico and Peru; and civil suit in federal court. 3 The civil remedies
available are the most practical, because in addition to having the
art returned, the threat of litigation serves as an excellent deterrent
to art purchasers. The fear of having art, purchased at considerable
cost, returned to the country from which it was stolen would cer-
tainly make a buyer examine all pertinent documents.
II. Historical and Procedural Background of Goldberg
The Byzantine mosaics purchased by Peg Goldberg, an Indiana
art dealer, were originally part of a large mosaic dating from A.D.
520 that was attached to the apse of the Church of the Panagia
Kanakaria in Lythrankomi, a village in the northern part of Cy-
prus.' 4 The church mosaic has great historical significance since dur-
ing the period of Iconoclasm in the eighth century all religious art
was ordered destroyed to prevent veneration of religious icons. 15 The
mosaics in this case, however, were one of the six or seven Byzantine
mosaics that survived the edict.' 6 The mosaics depicted Jesus as a
young boy seated in the lap of his mother, the Virgin Mary, who is
sitting on a throne surrounded by a mandorla 7 of light. This central
mosaic was bordered by two archangels. Next to each archangel was
a frieze' 8 with the busts of the twelve apostles.
Over the passage of time the mosaic deteriorated and some of it
was destroyed. By 1950 only the figure of Jesus, one archangel, and
nine of the twelve apostles remained.' 9 The four mosaics that were
taken from Cyprus included the figure of the adolescent Jesus, the
archangel, and the apostles James and Matthew.2"
13. Public pressure is a non-legal remedy to recover the stolen art from a museum which
is in possession of it. See generally Lost Sacred African Art Turns Up in Gallery Here, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 25, 1973, at Al, col. 6; Owner Returning Statue to Kom, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31,
1973, at A1, col. 6; Italians Accuse Boston Museum Chiefs: You Smuggled the Raphael, The
Times (London) Feb. 7, 1971, at I, col. 2; Syrian Mosaic Returned by the Newark Museum,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1974, at A16, col. 1.
14. See Autocephalous v. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1377 (S.D. Ind. 1989). The apse
of a church is the "vaulted semicircular . . . recess in a building especially at the end of the
choir of a church." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE 74 (1967) [herein-
after DICTIONARY].
15. Judge Orders Art Dealer to Return Rare Mosaics to Church of Cyprus, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 4, 1989, at CI, col. I [hereinafter Goldberg Article).
16. Autocephalous v. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1377 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
17. Id. at 1377-78. A mandorla is an "almond shape area or space especially a sche-
matic aureole containing a representation of a sacred personage." DICTIONARY, supra note 14,
at 870.
18. A frieze is the part of a "classical entablature between the architrave and the cor-
nice usually decorated with sculpture in low relief." DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 569.
19. Autocephalous v. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1378 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
20. Goldberg Article, supra note 15, at C25, col. 1.
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During the Turkish military invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the
Greek Cypriots of Lythrankomi were forced to flee northern Cyprus
for the southern part of the island, which was controlled by the Re-
public of Cyprus. 1 After the invasion, reports filtered in that many
of the churches and national monuments in northern Cyprus had
been destroyed. It was some time between August 1976 and October
1979 that the Kanakaria Church was vandalized and the mosaics
were taken.22 In November 1979, a visitor to the church noticed the
mosaics were missing and reported the theft to the Cyprus Depart-
ment of Antiquities2 3 which for the next nine years engaged in ef-
forts to recover the mosaics by circulating press releases and contact-
ing Byzantine art authorities 4
The mosaics reappeared in 1988. Goldberg was in Amsterdam
on behalf of a client to examine a painting for possible purchase.2"
The sale of the painting never took place, but Goldberg was in-
formed by Robert Fitzgerald, an art dealer whom Goldberg testified
she had known for a few years, of four early Christian mosaics that
were for sale. 8 After meeting with Dutch art dealer Michael van
Rijn and California attorney Ronald Faulk, Goldberg "fell in love"
with the mosaics and decided to purchase them. 7
At the trial, Goldberg stated that she knew that Robert Fitzger-
ald was in the habit of using one of four different names and that
Michael van Rijn, in addition to alleging to be a descendant of Rem-
brandt, had been convicted in absentia in France of forging Marc
Chagall's-signature on lithographs he was selling.2 8 She was told that
the seller, Aydin Dikman, had found the mosaics in the rubble of an
"extinct" Cypriot church and was granted permission by the Turkish
Cypriot authorities to export them.29 According to van Rijn, the
seller wanted $3 million for the mosaics but wished to sell them
quickly because he "had recently become quite ill and had [a] cash
21. Autocephalous v. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1378-79 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
22. Id. at 1379.
23. Id. at 1380.
24. Id. at 1379-80. " 'The Cypriots have brought the loss of these mosaics to the atten-
tion of people who would have been more directly involved with Byzantine art.' Dr. Marion
True, Curator of Antiquities at the J. Paul Getty Museum." Id. The approach by the Cypriots
was "consistent with what is happening in the art world today, the goal is to stifle the trade at
the point of destination." Dr. Gary Vikan id. at 1389.
25. Id. at 1381.
26. Id.
27. Id. Interestingly, Michael van Rijn purchased an El Greco painting from Wilder-
stein's, a New York art dealer, for $2 million in 1983. A year and a half before the sale, the
Rumanian government had made a claim that the El Greco belonged to them and not to the
Rumanian royal family that had sold it to Wilderstein's. The claim was later dismissed when
the Rumanian government failed to prove that it held title to the painting. L.A. Daily J., Mar.
1I, 1987, at 4, col. 3. See also infra text accompanying notes 118-26 for another case in that
Wilderstein's sold property that had questionable title.
28. Goldberg Article, supra note 15, at C25, col. 2.
29. Autocephalous v. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1381 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
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problem." 30 Goldberg was shown export documents that allegedly
proved that the mosaics were exported properly from northern Cy-
prus. The documents, however, made no mention of Dikman or the
mosaics.31
The final purchase price was settled at $1.08 million and
Goldberg sought to finance it through Merchants National Bank of
Indianapolis (Merchants). 32 Goldberg's contact at the bank was Otto
N. Frenzel III, the Vice Chairman of Merchants." Frenzel had
known Goldberg for several years and had purchased art from her."
Merchants had even asked for Goldberg's advice in deciding whether
to loan money for art purchases. Frenzel agreed to help in securing
a $1.2 million loan3 6 to buy the mosaics if she was sure of the "pro-
priety of purchasing the mosaics."'3 7 She testified that she had told
Frenzel and the loan officer that she would be keeping ten percent
($120,000) for her expenses.33 Both Frenzel and the loan officer tes-
tified that they understood the purchase price of the mosaics to be
$1.2 million. 9 In order to secure the loan, Goldberg signed a busi-
ness promissory note binding Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.
as a corporation and herself individually. Once secured, Merchants
sent the money to a bank in Geneva where Goldberg executed the
sale on July 7, 1988." The bill of sale she received lists $1.2 million
as the price Goldberg paid for the mosaics. 2
Goldberg then returned to the United States with the mosaics. "
By the fall of 1988 she had offered to sell them to the Getty Mu-
seum." By this time, the Cypriot Ambassador had learned that the
mosaics were in the United States and began inquiries to discover
their exact location and possessor.' Goldberg's continued contact
with the Getty Museum led the curator of antiquities to contact the
Autocephalous Church's law firm and United States Customs
Service.' 6
Cypriot officials were subsequently informed that Goldberg was
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1382.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1383.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1384.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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the current owner of the mosaics and was holding them in Indianap-
olis. They requested that she return the mosaics, and upon her re-
fusal, they brought suit in federal district court in Indiana for their
return."7
The plaintiffs, the Autocephalous Church and the Republic of
Cyprus, filed their complaint on March 29, 1989. The parties sub-
mitted an "Agreed Order," approved by the court on March 31,
1989, which directed the plaintiffs to post a $150,000 security bond
in return for the defendant's promise not to take any "action to alter,
destroy, sell or transfer possession of the four Kanakaria mosaics." '48
On May 24, 1989, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(TRNC) moved for intervention as a plaintiff. 9 That motion was
denied, as was TRNC's motion to stay the trial." The' ensuing trial
was bifurcated leaving possession of the mosaics the only issue to be
determined.5"
III. United States Statutes Dealing with Stolen Art
A. National Stolen Property Act
Of all the remedies available in the United States that enable a
foreign country to recover their stolen property only one makes it a
federal crime: the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA), enacted in
1934.52 Its two sections encompass the receivership, concealment, or
sale of stolen foreign goods. Section 2314 deals with the interstate or
foreign transport of goods that are known by the transporter to be
stolen, while Section 2315 refers to the receipt of the goods with the
knowledge they have been stolen."
The first use of the NSPA came in the 1970s in United States
v. Hollinshead.5 4 Hollinshead, a dealer in pre-Columbian art, ar-
47. Id. at 1385.
48. Id. at 1376.
49. Id. at 1377.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. The applicable provisions state: "Whoever transports in interstate or foreign com-
merce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more,
knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud; ...Shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1988).
Whoever receives, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of any goods,
wares, or merchandise, securities, or money of the value of $5,000 ori more, or
pledges or accepts as security for a loan any goods, wares, or merchandise, or
securities, of the value of $500 or more, moving as, or which are a part of, or
which constitute interstate or foreign commerce, knowing the same to have been
stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken; . . . .Shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2315 (1988).
53. Id.
54. 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974).
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ranged to receive a rare and extremely valuable stele 6 from a site in
Guatemala. The stele had been the subject of interest of archaeolo-
gist Ian Graham, who had visited the site and recorded it as Stele
No. 2.56 The stele was cut into many pieces and shipped to Hol-
linshead in California.57 During an attempt by Hollinshead to sell it
to the Brooklyn Museum, Dr. Graham was contacted by a curator
from the museum who asked Graham's opinion of the stele.5 8 Dr.
Graham notified the authorities, resulting in the discovery of the
smuggling trail . 9 The government of Guatemala filed suit in a Cali-
fornia federal court seeking its return.
One commentator believes this was the first time a foreign gov-
ernment had brought such a suit."0 The defendants alleged that they
did not know that the removal of the stele constituted a violation of
Guatemalan law." The court pointed out, however, that by the very
nature of their conduct, the defendants knew the stele was stolen. 2
The court, in applying the NSPA to the facts, determined that the
defendants indeed knew that the article transported was stolen and
that there was no need for the United States to prove that the de-
fendants knew it was stolen from Guatemala. 3
In Hollinshead, the stolen art never left the hands of the con-
spirator. All of Hollinshead's attempts to sell the stele failed, so no
good-faith purchaser was ever involved in the scheme. Hollinshead
and his co-conspirators acted with the requisite scienter to be prose-
cuted under the NSPA.
The next case which invoked the NSPA was United States v.
McClain."' In that case, the defendants were arrested for transport-
ing and receiving stolen pre-Columbian artifacts. The defendants
had five teams working at archaeological sites in Mexico and smug-
gling unearthed artifacts to California with the aid of forged or
backdated documents and permits;65 the documents were antedated
due to a new law which prohibited private ownership of artifacts af-
ter a certain date.66 The defendants would then receive the objects in
California and either sell them immediately or take them to Europe,
auction them off to their agents who would bring them back to the
55. Id. A stele is an "upright stone slab or pillar bearing an inscription or design and
serving as a monumental marker or the like." DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 1392.
56. P. BATOR, supra note 8, at 69.
57. United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1974).
58. P. BATOR, supra note 8, at 69.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 70-71.
61. United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1974).
62. Id. at 1154.
63. Id.
64. United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979).
65. Id. at 660-61.
66. Id. at 661.
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United States with foreign bills of sale to legitimize a resale.67 Dur-
ing a meeting with Federal Bureau of Investigation undercover
agents, the defendants mentioned that they were very careful since
their activities were "illegal" and "against the law."68
The defendants argued that the NSPA was not applicable to
items deemed stolen only by a foreign nation's "declaration of own-
ership."69 The court rejected this argument and held that the NSPA
applies to a foreign nation's declarations of ownership "even though
the owned objects have never been reduced to possession by a foreign
government. '70 Under United States law a state or national govern-
ment may be an owner even though it never physically possesses the
goods it owns. 71
The problem with applying the NSPA to the case of stolen art
lies in the requirement of knowledge of the theft or the conversion to
be present. The country or person from whom the art has been stolen
is only seeking its return from the present owner through civil reme-
dies. In order to prosecute under the NSPA, the United States gov-
ernment must initiate a criminal action. The United States is faced
with the problem of proving scienter, which is all but impossible if
the art has passed through several buyers; each record of sale would
create seemingly legitimate chain of title. In most cases, the stolen
art is only rediscovered when it appears on the legal art market with
its current owner unaware of the item's infamous background.72
Applied to the facts of Goldberg, the NSPA would probably
have failed to convict Goldberg of receiving stolen property.
Goldberg made inquiries into the export of the mosaics and directed
Faulk to inspect the export documents. Faulk reported that every-
thing seemed to be in order.73 From the comments made after the
case was decided, it seems that close scrutiny in the purchase of for-
eign art has not been the trade practice.74 Goldberg testified that in
addition to examining the export documents, she inquired if the
67. Id.
68. Id. at 661-62. The defendants also told the undercover Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion agents that they should visit Hollinshead if they wanted to buy valuable stelae and large
figurines. Id. at 662.
69. Id. at 663.
70. Id. at 664.
71. Id.
72. See Kunstsammulungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2nd Cir. 1982);
DeWeerth v. Baldinger v. Wilderstein, 836 F.2d 103 (2nd Cir. 1987).
73. Autocephalous v. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1382 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
74. "This decision (Goldberg) really tells both museum and private individuals that the
danger of buying stolen art is very serious, and their investigations should be very thorough."
Constance Lowenthal, the executive director of the International Foundation for Art Research
in New York City. Goldberg Article, supra note 15, at C25, col. 1. Gary K. Vikan, the curator
of medieval art at the Walters Art Gallery in Baltimore who testified at Goldberg's trial,
stated: "The significance of the decision is quite profound. We are going to use this decision as
the basis of formulating a policy on the purchase of antiquities. We will ask such questions as
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mosaics were stolen or if a treaty would prohibit their importation to
the United States.76 She stated that she had contacted IFAR, the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's
(UNESCO) office in Geneva, and custom officials in the United
States, Germany, Switzerland, and Turkey.7" Yet there was no rec-
ord of Goldberg having made an effort to thoroughly examine
whether Dikman was the true owner of the mosaics.7 The court
found sufficiently suspicious circumstances to raise considerable
doubt as to whether Dikman was the rightful owner and thus could
have conveyed property rights in the mosaics to Goldberg.78
The NSPA, however, requires knowledge that the goods were
stolen. Stealing art work and illegally exporting it are not the same
thing.79 One scholar places illegally exported items into three catego-
ries: A legally owned but illegally exported item; a stolen and ille-
gally imported item; or an item with a questionable title that is de-
cided by a matter of law or fact.8 A piece of art may be in the
hands of -the true owner yet taken from the country against that
country's export laws. Goldberg apparently did not have knowledge
that the mosaics were stolen. She was shown documents alleging
proper export from Cyprus. The suspicious circumstances concern
the export of the mosaics, not the possible theft of them. The court's
determination that Goldberg was not a good faith purchaser does not
make her a knowing receiver of stolen property. The court examined
the testimony and the documents that were offered to show proper
export of the mosaics, and determined she was not a good faith pur-
chaser. This, however, does not support a finding that she knowingly
received stolen property.
B. UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Prevent-
ing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cul-
tural Property
In 1970, the member countries of UNESCO adopted the Con-
vention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Im-
port, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (Con-
vention)."1 The Convention marked the first international attempt to
is the price appropriate? Was the work attached to a building? Was it removed in time of
war? the more suspicious the circumstances the circumspect the buyer must be." Id. at I, col.
I.
75. Autocephalous v. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1283 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1403.
78. Id. at 1402.
79. Id. at 1377.
80. P. BATOR, supra note 8, at 11.
81. UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Im-
port, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S.
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control the stolen art market.82 The operative section contained in
article 7 requires each country to prevent the export of any item of
any "cultural property"83 that is not accompanied by proper export
certification and to prevent the importation of any items of "cultural
property" without proper export certification from another country. 4
These requirements are extraordinarily sweeping due to the large
number of items that are included in the definition of "cultural prop-
erty" in article 1.85
Parties to the Convention whose "cultural patrimony is in jeop-
ardy from pillage"8  may call upon other parties for aid. This assis-
tance can include imposing controls on the exports and imports of
the stolen cultural property in international commerce. There are
currently sixty-one nations which have ratified the UNESCO
Convention .87
The United States' enabling legislation for the UNESCO Con-
vention, the Convention of Cultural Property Implementation Act
(Cultural Property Implementation Act),88 was delayed for over ten
years due to strong lobbying efforts on the part of museums and col-
lectors who feared government intervention in its acquisitions. In rat-
jfying the UNESCO Convention in 1972, the United States Senate
limited its application to institutions whose acquisition policies were
controlled nationally. 9 This excluded all private dealers, collectors
and museums from the Convention and any of the enabling legisla-
tion. From 1972 to 1983, Congress and special interest groups grap-
pled over the wording of such legislation.90 In 1983, the United
States finally passed the Cultural Property Implementation Act,
which enacted, with modifications, only articles 7 and 9 of the
231 (1972), reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter UNESCO Convention].
82. The only other multilateral agreement was the Convention for the Protection of Cul-
tural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict at the Hague, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215.
83. UNESCO Convention, supra note 81, at art. 7. See infra note 85 for the description
of cultural property.
84. Id.
85. "For the purposes of this Convention, the term 'cultural property' means property
which, on religious or secular grounds is specifically designated by each State as being of
importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science and which belongs to
the following categories: . . ." UNESCO Convention, supra note 81, at art. 1. These catego-
ries included rare specimens of flora and fauna, property relating to history and the lives of
national heroes, postage stamps, and rare manuscripts and books. Id.
86. Id.
87. Autocephalous v. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1379 n.2 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
88. Convention of Cultural Property Implementation Act, title II!, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et.
seq. (1988).
89. "The United States understands Article 7(a) to apply to institutions whose acquisi-
tions policy is subject to national control under existing domestic legislation and not to require
the enactment of new legislation to establish national control over other institutions." 118
CONG. REc. 27925 (1972). These nationally controlled institutions include only the National
Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C. and the other branches of the Smithsonian Institution.
90. P. BATOR, supra note 8, at 62-68.
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UNESCO Convention.91 The power of the Cultural Property Law is
limited in that the United States can only take action to protect cul-
tural pillage by either a Presidential determination92 or in an emer-
gency situation.93
IV. United States Treaties Dealing with Stolen Art
A. Mexico
Following a significant increase in the number of pre-Colum-
bian art works being stolen from Mexico and brought to-the United
States, the United States in 1970 signed a treaty with Mexico to
provide for the recovery and return of stolen archaeological, histori-
cal, and cultural property.9 4 The treaty dealt specifically with
"archaeological, historical and cultural properties" 95 dating from the
Pre-Columbian and colonial periods of both the United States and
Mexico. Pursuant to the treaty the artifacts protected must be
owned by the federal, state or municipal governments of either na-
tion, and documentation of ownership must be presented in order to
initiate proceedings to effect the return of the artifacts.96 The enact-
ing legislation provides that if an "owner" failed to present proper
certification from the government of the country of origin of a pre-
Columbian monumental or architectural sculpture or mural, a cus-
toms officer should seize the artifact, and if the owner failed to pro-
duce certification within ninety days, the artifact would be forfeited
to the United States.9" The United States would then return the pre-
Columbian work to the country of its origin. 98
This treaty was brought about by an exigent situation concern-
ing the art work produced during a certain time period. 99 While each
country may feel that an emergency exists when an artifact is stolen,
this treaty deals with preserving the patrimony of Mexico and the
91. See supra note 89 for discussion of article 7. Article 9 provides for how requests
from countries seeking help under the Convention are to be treated.
92. 19 U.S.C. § 2602 (1988).
93. 19 U.S.C. § 2603 (1988).
94. United States-Mexico Treaty, supra note 10.
95. "Pre-Columbian monumental or architectural sculpture or mural" is defined in the
treaty as:
(A) any stone carving or wall art which-(i) is the product of a pre-Colum-
bian Indian culture of Mexico, Central America, South America, or the Carib-
bean Islands; (ii) was an immobile monument or architectural structure or was a
part of, or affixed to, any such monument or structure; and (iii) is subject to
export control by the country of origin; or
(B) any fragment or part of any stone carving or wall art described in sub-
paragraph (A) of this paragraph.
19 U.S.C. 2095 (1988).
96. 19 U.S.C. § 2092 (1988).
97. 19 U.S.C. § 2093(a) (1988).
98. 19 U.S.C. § 2093(b) (1988).
99. P. BATOR, supra note 8, at 6-7.
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United States. The United States' willingness to enter into this
treaty was evidenced by self-interest in its own national culture. 100
It is also easier to deal with Mexico since the flow and interac-
tion of goods between the United States and Mexico is more com-
mon, raising the awareness of customs agents on both sides of the
border of proper export documentation, since pre-Columbian art is
fairly recognizable. The idea that a treaty must be entered into with
every country that believes that it needs special protection from the
loss of its cultural property, however, would create endless imple-
mentation problems due to language and translation difficulties. In
addition, if customs agents were made to scrutinize every piece of art
and every accompanying document, the delays and the costs of art
importation would prove excessive.
B. Peru
The United States and Peru signed an agreement in 1981 simi-
lar to that concluded between the United States and Mexico.1"' The
United States-Peru agreement, however, deals primarily with com-
munications between the parties relating to stolen property to be in-
troduced into the international market. 02 If such a situation is about
to occur, the parties agree to search and locate the stolen property
once it enters their respective territories and to use all legal means to
recover and return the property to the requesting party.'0 a
V. Civil Remedies Available to Original Owner
A plaintiff claiming theft of a piece of art has a cause of action
in replevin.' 0° Replevin demands the return of the object without
damages or criminal prosecution of the thieves.'05 The defendant can
raise defenses to the action by claiming that he was a purchaser in
good faith and that the true owner failed to act upon his rights
within a reasonable time. 06 "Reasonable time" is determined by
taking into account such factors as concealment of the object and
diligent pursuit of the object by the original owner.'0 7
Civil remedies are much more efficient than criminal sanctions
for several reasons. First, civil remedies encourage the original own-
100. See Convention on the Cultural Property Implementation Act: Hearings on H.R.
5643 and S. 2261 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1978),
101. United States-Peru Treaty, supra note 11.
102. Id. at art. I1(1).
103. Id. at art. 11(2).
104. Autocephalous v. Goldberg, 717 F. Sup. 1374, 1375 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
105. "Replevin is an action at law for the recovery of specific personal chattels, wrong-
fully taken and detained." 77 C.J.S. REPLEVIN 1 (1952).
106. See infra text accompanying notes 123-26 and 182-86.
107. See infra text accompanying note 165.
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ers to sue the converters, thereby increasing the chances of discover-
ing the various persons in the chain of possession and increasing the
costs to the thieves in terms of the cost of the lawsuit and in the
imposed penalties. Second, civil sanctions can be more broadly ap-
plied- than criminal sanctions to the receivers and purchasers of the
stolen property. Third, fewer of the constitutional protections that
are allowed to a criminal defendant are allowed to a civil defendant;
thus, the civil suit would be a more favorable remedy than the crimi-
nal prosecution of the holders of the stolen property.108 Additionally,
a court need not examine legislative history or intent in a civil suit as
they would in applying a criminal statute 0 9 nor would there be "po-
tential interference with the operations of the State Depart-
ment."' 1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), a foreign country could
bring suit in federal court where the court has original jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the claim, provided that there be a diver-
sity of citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000."'
A. The Effect of Due Diligence and Statutes of Limitations in Pre-
serving the Original Owner's Rights
The principle of due diligence and the statute of limitations are
based on the theory that plaintiffs may not be passive in pursuing
their rights; plaintiffs must act prudently and quickly to bring their
causes of action. Art purchasing is a double-edged sword; the buyer
must exercise due diligence in determining whether the art was sto-
len and whether the seller has good title, and the original owner
must also exercise due diligence in locating the art after its theft or
disappearance. The Goldberg court discussed the favorable judicial
attitude toward tolling the statutes of limitations when the court de-
termines that the plaintiff did not delay in bringing a claim. " 2 Stat-
utes of limitations are considered "statutes in repose"'13 that "are
enacted upon the presumption that one having a well-founded claim
will not delay in enforcing it."'1 4 The statutes also prevent surprises
in reviving stale claims "1 5 long after "evidence has been lost, memo-
ries have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. 11 6
108. Blakey & Goldsmith, Criminal Redistribution of Stolen Property: The Need for
Law Reform, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1512, 1601 (1976).
109. Norwell, American Tools to Control the Illegal Movement of Foreign Origin in
Archaeological Materials: Criminal and Civil Approaches, 6 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM.
77, 103, n.140 (1978).
110. Id. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
11l. Autocephalous v. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1377 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
112. Id. at 1385.
113. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).
114. Autocephalous v. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1385 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
115. Servoamation Cor. v. State Tax Com., 60 A.D. 2d 374, 400 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1977).
116. Elkins v. Derby, 12 Cal. 3d 410, 525 P.2d 81, 115 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1974).
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1. Original owner must use due diligence in locating the cur-
rent possessor of the stolen art.-The purpose of due diligence privi-
leges are appropriate when dealing with stolen art. Art loses its value
if it is altered or disguised, so a thief will endeavor to keep it in its
original state.117 The fact that the art will not be converted makes it
easier to recognize and easier for an owner to find his stolen property
than an owner who has had his car, stereo, or jewelry stolen since
these items are easily converted or used for parts, rendering recogni-
tion almost impossible.
In DeWeerth v. Baldinger,1 8 a West German national and the
alleged former owner of a Monet painting brought suit against an
American purchaser. The Monet disappeared during World War II
after it was sent by its owner, DeWeerth, to the home of her sister
for safekeeping.119 It arrived at her sister's estate where it was dis-
played. During the quartering of American soldiers at the castle,
however, the painting disappeared.12 0 The Monet reappeared in the
United States in 1956 and was purchased by defendant Baldinger in
1957 for $30,900.121 Thirty additional years passed before DeWeerth
learned of the painting's whereabouts, even though Baldinger had
allowed the Monet to be displayed at two public exhibitions and in a
published volume of Monet's .works. 2
The court found that DeWeerth had not used due diligence as
required under New York law to seek the recovery of the Monet and
to learn the name of its current owner.12 3 New York treats a good
faith purchaser as innocent until the true owner makes the defect in
title known and the purchaser refuses to return the property. 24 Un-
less the true owner exercises due diligence to identify the good faith
purchaser, however, the accrual time of the action could be extended
indefinitely, while a thief would be immune from an action after only
three years.1 25 Thus, due diligence is required to "prevent unneces-
sary hardship to the good-faith purchaser. '12
117. This statement deals primarily with paintings, since a portion of a painting has no
value. Although artifacts are worth much more if intact, cut up portions of friezes and stelae
can be very valuable and are easier to transport.
118. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987).
119. Id. at 105.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 110-11.
124. Id. at 108. See also Menzel v. List, 24 N.Y.S.2d 91, 246 N.E.2d 742, 298 N.Y.S.
979 (1969), which was a replevin action for a Chagall painting confiscated by the Nazis and
bought by the defendant. The court found that the statute of limitations did not run until the
defendant refused to return the painting upon Menzel's demand.
125. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 108-09 (2nd Cir. 1987).
126. Id. at 109. "[T]he primary purpose of a limitations period is fairness to a defendant
(citation omitted). A defendant should 'be secure in his reasonable expectation that the slate
has been wiped clean of ancient obligations, and he ought not to be called on to resist a claim
[Vol. 8:3
STOLEN ART
The court in Kunstsammulungen Zue Weimar v. Elicofon12
was faced with determining the rightful owner of two paintings by
Albrecht Diirer which were stolen in 1945 from a castle in what is
now East Germany, and discovered in Brooklyn, New York in
1966.12 The current owner, Elicofon, did not know that the portraits
were stolen nor that they were Diirers. 129 The opinion traces the his-
tory of the portraits and the law of Germany through the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. 3 °
The court first determined which plaintiffs were able to assert
ownership over the Dtlrers. The court found that title had passed
through a 1927 agreement, between the heirs of the Grand Duke of
Saxony-Weimar and the Territory of Weimar. In this agreement,
the Grand Duke's property interests in Thuringia, including the
Grand Ducal art collection containing the Diirers, were transferred
to the government.' 1 Title had then been transferred to the German
Democratic Republic (GDR) by either an act of the GDR in 1952
or indirectly as a successor to the Third Reich, to whom the property
rights of the Land of Thuringia had passed.13 2
Having determined that the GDR had received a property inter-
est in the Dfirers, the court turned to Elicofon's claim that the New
York statute of limitations barred the action.3 3 The court applied
New York law which states that an innocent purchaser of stolen
goods is in lawful possession of the goods until the true owner asserts
his claim."3 Elicofon's status as an innocent purchaser became one
of a wrongdoer when he refused to return the Diirers after the
owner's request of return. Thus, the statute of limitations did not
accrue until the refusal provided that the plaintiff not unreasonably
delay the demand by not pursuing the stolen property. 35 The court
stated that the determination of what constitutes a reasonable time
is made on a case by case basis. 13 6 Although the court did find some
where the evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared' (cita-
tion omitted). There is also the need to protect the judicial system from the burden of adjudi-
cating stale and groundless claims (citation omitted)." Id.
127, 678 F.2d 1150 (2nd Cir. 1982).
128. Id. at 1152.
129, Id. at 1152-53.
130. This case is particularly fascinating in its discussion of the disintegration of dynas-
tic Germany and the subsequent formation of the German Democratic Republic and Federal
Republic of Germany. This history is pertinent since under New York law there exists a judi-
cially created "non-recognition" toll that prevented the statute of limitation from running until
the United States recognized the GDR in 1974. Id. at 1164.
131. Id. at 1158-59.
132. Id. at 1151.
133. Id. at 1160.
134. Id. at 1161.
135. Kunstsammulungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 849 (1981), afl'd,
678 F.2d 1150 (2nd Cir. 1982).
136. Id.
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deficiencies in the efforts of the Kunstsammulungen Zu Weimar
(KZW), the circumstances of East-West relations and the political
tensions that followed World War II had to be taken into considera-
tion. 131 Based on the political climate, the court determined that de-
ficiencies did not prove that the KZW had not been diligent and
decided that the delay of the action was "reasonable and excusable
as a matter of law."'3 8
The United States' enabling legislation for the UNESCO Con-
vention incorporates this theory of due diligence which the courts
have applied in exempting any articles that have been in the United
States for at least ten consecutive years and have been exhibited in
museums or religious institutions for at least five of those years, and
by barring foreign governments from bringing suit if they have had
fair notice of the article's location during that time.1 39 This exclusion
lends credence to the theory that the art world is an intertwined net-
work which allows the location of a piece of art to be readily known.
The court in Goldberg determined that the Autocephalous
Church had exercised due diligence in attempting to find the mosa-
ics. The Church had contacted the United Nations, UNESCO muse-
ums, leading Byzantine scholars, and the press."" This systematic
approach should set a standard for others who wish to insure their
ability to recover stolen property from an American owner. "1
2. The buyer must also exercise due diligence when purchas-
ing any piece of art.-A purchaser of property, especially when the
purchaser is knowledgeable in the area of the purchase, must be
wary of suspicious circumstances that surround the sale." 2 The pur-
chaser has a duty to examine a questionable title to protect against
future claims from the original owner.' 43 This can be a difficulty es-
pecially in the art world where secrecy is a trade practice. Art deal-
ers and auction houses often sell art on behalf of well-to-do families
who wish to conceal the fact that they are facing financial difficul-
ties. One commentator points out that while few pieces of art come
137. Id. at 852.
138. Id. (footnote omitted).
139. 19 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(b). See also H.R. Rep. No. 615, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 17
(1977).
140. Autocephalous v. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1389 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
141. For a discussion of resources available to buyer to verify the title of a piece of art,
see Note, Title Disputes in the Art Market, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443 (1980).
142. U.C.C. 2-104(1) defines merchant as "a person who deals in goods of the kind or
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skills peculiar to the
practices or goods involved in the transaction . .." U.C.C. 2-103(l)(b) provides that good
faith on the part of merchants is "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade." Id.
143. Autocephalous v. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1404 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
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with a perfect and complete pedigree,' 44 the purchaser is not pre-
vented from inquiring into suspicious documents and circumstances
and insuring that at least the seller has the ability to convey good
title. This is especially true in Goldberg, since the defendant was an
art dealer. Although Goldberg was not an expert in Byzantine art,
she was experienced in the art trade."
The defendant's due diligence was not favorably discussed by
the court in Goldberg. The court noted the extreme indifference with
which Goldberg conducted her inquiry into the true ownership of the
mosaics; phone calls she alleged to have made were not recorded;14
export documents she was shown were dubious on their face, yet she
did not question them.14 7 Goldberg's own testimony shows that she
knew of the middlemen's shady backgrounds." 8 The court also noted
that the hasty way in which the deal was completed and the mosaics
turned over to Goldberg raised suspicions." The hurried nature of
the sale raised the possibility that Goldberg knew that the mosaics
were stolen yet wanted them no matter what the cost. Had Goldberg
offered to make a good faith deposit, put the remaining funds in es-
crow, and had a contract drawn up that would go into effect on a
specific date contingent on "the satisfactory resolution of prove-
nance, authenticity, and restorability,"' 5 ° the mosaics might have
been secured for Goldberg and she might have had time to further
examine the title. 15' The cost of her cursory examination of the
mosaics extends beyond Goldberg's lost possession of the mosaics; it
has brought about the bankruptcy of her art dealership.'52
There are organizations that can be contacted and procedures
followed to insure that artistic property is not stolen. As stated
before, IFAR and Interpol maintain lists of art reported stolen. Each
country's customs agency can then determine from its records
144. P. BATOR, supra note 8, at 84 n.146.
145. Goldberg's area of expertise lay in nineteenth and twentieth century American and
European art. Barbara Divver, another art dealer as well as a friend and mentor, suggested to
Goldberg that she get a Byzantine expert to give her expert advice. Goldberg declined to do so.
Autocephalous v. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1404 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
146. - Id. at 1403.
147. Id. at 1402. "The Court cannot improve on Dr. Vikan's summation of the suspi-
cious circumstances surrounding this sale: 'All the red flags are up, all the red lights are on, all
'the sirens are blaring.' " Id.
148. Goldberg testified that she knew little of Michael van Rijn, yet she did know that
he was a felon convicted in France for art forgery and that he was being sued for failing to pay
money to a gallery. Id. at 1402. She also stated she had known Robert Fitzgerald for several
years, knew of his aliases, and knew he was currently being sued for his involvement with a
purported Michaelangelo modello. Id.
149. Id. at 1403.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. When Goldberg's lawyer, Joe E. Emerson, was asked if the court's ruling would
bankrupt her, he replied, " 'The debt approximates her net worth. You can draw your own
conclusions.' " Goldberg Article, supra note 15, at 1, C25, col. 1.
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whether the art has been removed from that country legally.
Goldberg is a perfect example and a warning for buyers who
have not allayed all suspicions and doubts as to a piece of art work.
The price that Goldberg paid was low compared to the multi-million
dollar price tag the mosaics should have had. However, the price was
still steep enough to refrain from taking the gamble that the title to
the mosaics was good and that no other owner could step forward
and claim them.
B. Statute of Limitations
Another way in which the courts encourage due diligence when
purchasing what may be stolen art is the tolling of the statute of
limitations. The general rule of law is that the statute of limitations
is not tolled when property is concealed from the owner.' 53 The
courts allow an owner reasonable time to discover the stolen property
and assert title. The "discovery rule" is applied to determine when
the plaintiff's cause of action accrues. 54 The "discovery rule" simply
prevents the statute of limitations from running in situations where
the plaintiff, "using due diligence, cannot bring suit because he is
unable to determine a cause of action.' 55 In an action in replevin,
the plaintiff brings suit for the return of a specific property. If the
plaintiff cannot locate the specific property there is no cause of ac-
tion. 156 Thus, the encouragement of due diligence prevents an owner
from sitting on his rights and prevents a good faith purchaser from
being brought to trial.
In DeWeerth, the court found a lack of due diligence on the
part of the original owner because the painting had been exhibited
and even published in a collection of Monet works. 57 There were
numerous opportunities for DeWeerth to discover the whereabouts of
the stolen art. The true owner of the art work is required to pursue
all avenues to recover the art.'58 The art world is unique in that it is
a recognized legitimate profession as well as a black market. The
people who come in contact with art are educated and professional
and are not always willing to aid the thieves. In Hollinshead,
DeWeerth, and Goldberg, the location of the stolen art was discov-
153. Autocephalous v. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1389 (S.D. Ind. 1989). See also 51
AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions 124 (general rule is that the statute of limitations runs
from the time of theft except in the case of concealment); and 54 C.I.S. Limitations on Ac-
tions 88 (general rule is that fraudulent concealment of stolen property tolls the statute of
limitations until such a time that the property is discovered or should have been discovered by
using due diligence).
154. Autocephalous v. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1389 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
155. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 490, 416 A.2d 862, 869 (1980).
156. See supra note 99.
157. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 112 (2nd Cir. 1987).
158. Id. at I10.
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ered when an art expert was contacted in connection with the sale of
the piece. In Goldberg, the experts at the Getty Museum raised sus-
picions that the work may have been stolen and aided in informing
Cyprus that Goldberg was in possession of the mosaics. 59
O'Keeffe v. Snyder'60 is an interesting application of the discov-
ery rule. In this case, Georgia O'Keeffe attempted to recover three of
her paintings that had been stolen in 1947 from the art gallery
owned by her husband, Alfred Stieglitz. She did not report the theft
nor did she pursue the person, an employee of the gallery, whom she
suspected of the theft.16 The paintings were discovered in a
Princeton, New Jersey art gallery in 1977, and O'Keeffe brought an
action in replevin against the owner.1" 2 The New Jersey Supreme
Court reiterated the principle that in order "[t]o avoid harsh results
from the mechanical application of the statute [of limitations], the
courts have developed a concept known as the discovery rule."1 6 a
Since a replevin action is for the recovery of a specific piece of prop-
erty, the plaintiff must know who is in possession of the property;
without knowledge of the possessor, the plaintiff cannot bring an
action.16
In arguendo, the court in Goldberg stated that even if the dis-
covery rule did not apply to a replevin action, the doctrine of fraudu-
lent concealment would have prevented the statute of limitations
from tolling. 65 The court cited the O'Keeffe decision in which the
New Jersey court limited the cause of action when the original
owner "discovers, or by exercise of reasonable diligence and intelli-
gence should have discovered, facts which form the basis of a cause
of action."' 66
Not all states have recognized that the statute of limitations
does not run until the owner has had reasonable time to discover
where the piece is located. Elicofon stated that under New York law
159. Autocephalous v. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1376 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
160. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862, 864-65 (1980).
161. Id. at 484-85, 416 A.2d 865-66. An interesting note to this case is that O'Keeffe.
was both the original owner and the artist. It seems she should have been more diligent to find
the paintings. There was factual dispute as to O'Keeffe's allegation of the theft since Ulrich A.
Frank, the third party defendant who sold the paintings to Snyder, testified that the paintings
had been in his father's possession before the alleged theft and remained in his family until he
sold them. Id. at 866.
162. Id. at 486, 416 A.2d 866.
163. Id. at 488, 416 A.2d 867.
164. Autocephalous v. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1389 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
165. Id. at 1387. "The harshness which may result from the application of a statute of
limitations has been avoided by judicial recognition of certain exceptions. One of these excep-
tions is the doctrine of fraudulent concealment which operates as an equitable doctrine to estop
a defendant from asserting a statute of limitations when he has, either by deception or by
violation of duty, concealed from the plaintiff material facts thereby preventing the plaintiff
from discovering a potential cause of action." (quoting Burks v. Rushmore, 534 N.E.2d 1101
(Ind. 1989)).
166. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 491, 416 A.2d 862, 869 (1980).
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the accrual date was the date for return of the goods."'. The inno-
cent purchaser becomes a wrongdoer only after refusing the owner's
demand for return of the artwork.168 Prior to the demand, the pur-
chaser is entitled to lawful possession.16 9 The KZW could not have
made the demand until it knew that Elicofon was in possession of the
Diirers. The court found that the KZW had been reasonably diligent
in attempting to locate the paintings. 7
Stolen art is probably the most easily influenced illegal market.
By deterring the purchaser from buying art without a careful and
thorough investigation of theft, the stolen art market will find itself
overflowing with stolen art but without purchasers. By encouraging
the owner to seek out all avenues in locating the stolen art work, a
buyer will need to be wary of an item which catches his eye. Because
of art's uniqueness and memorableness, the owner has a better
chance of recovery than most owners of stolen property.'
VI. Problems in Applying Foreign Law in Respect to Controlling
Stolen Art
International cooperation in this arena is not necessarily relia-
ble. While all countries profess their willingness to help in control-
ling traffic in stolen art, not all are willing to implement legislation.
One basic problem in relying on foreign law in controlling traffic in
stolen art is that Europe's finest museums are filled with pieces that
were taken, usually without permission, from other countries. The
most famous case concerns the marbles taken from the Parthenon in
Athens by the Earl of Elgin between 1801 and 1812.72 In 1816 the
Earl sold the marbles to the British Museum, where they have been
displayed and catalogued as "The Elgin Marbles" ever since.17 3
Other works of art have also acquired a second national home. Many
French Impressionist paintings have come to be recognized as much
a part of Russia as they are a part of France; Da Vinci's Mona Lisa
is readily identified with the Louvre; and the Museum of Art in Phil-
adelphia is renowned for its Van Gogh collection.
In most suits brought in the United States to recover stolen art,
the defendant has usually argued that the laws of another country
167. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 206(a) (Consol. 1978): "Where a demand is necessary to
entitle a person to commence an action the time within which the action must be commenced
shall be computed from the time when the right to make the demand is complete." Id.
168. Kunstsammulungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1161 (2nd Cir. 1982).
169. Id.
170. 536 F. Supp. 829, 852 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
171. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 109 (2nd Cir. 1987).
172. Merryman, Thinking about the Elgin Marbles, 83 MIcH. L. REV. 1880, 1882
(1985).
173. Id.
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apply and that he has become a bona fide purchaser."" The courts in
deciding the choice-of-law issue have consistently chosen to apply the
laws of the United States. 1 5 This is not always true in foreign coun-
tries where a choice-of-law decision can assist in laundering stolen
art and where bona fide purchasers are protected by the courts. In
Winkworth v. Christie's Ltd., 6 for example, art pieces were stolen
from the plaintiff in England and taken to Italy where they were
resold. The sale was conducted under Italian contract law since both
parties to the sale and the art works were physically in Italy at the
time of the sale.177 The art was returned to England where Chris-
tie's, a prestigious London auction house, put them up for sale. 7 8
The plaintiff subsequently brought suit. The defendant claimed that
under Italian law he had obtained good title. Italian law allows good
title to be conveyed even though the seller's title is defective, if the
purchaser is in good faith and is not aware of any illegality of the
property when he receives it.' 7 9 The transaction must also be carried
out in an appropriate manner with regard to documenting and evi-
dencing the sale.' The court adopted the lex situs of the painting
and held that the defendant had obtained good title.' 8'
A. Good Faith Purchaser and Statute of Limitations
The court in Goldberg discussed, in arguendo, that if Swiss law
had been found to apply to the case, a good faith exception would
have to be decided. Under Swiss law, a purchaser can acquire title to
stolen property that would be superior to that of the original owner if
it is purchased in good faith. 82 There is a presumption that the pur-
chaser had acted in good faith, and the plaintiff must overcome this
presumption by showing that suspicious circumstances surrounded
174. See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2nd Cir. 1987); Autocephalous v.
Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989); Kunstsammulungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon,
678 F.2d 1150 (2nd Cir. 1982).
175. Id.
176. Winkworth v. Christie's Ltd., I All ER 1121 (1980).
177. Id. at 1123.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1124-5.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1136.
182. Autocephalous v. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1400 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
"Where a person in possession of a movable chattel loses it or has it stolen from
him or otherwise taken from his against his will he can demand it back within a
period of five years from any person who is detaining it. Where the chattel has
been brought at a public auction on in a market overt or from any dealer in
property of the same kind it cannot be recovered from the first purchaser or any
subsequent bona fide purchaser, unless he is compensated for the purchase
money paid." Id. This public auction exception has created a large number of
"private" public auctions in Switzerland for the sole purpose of legitimizing sto-
len art. B. BURNHAM, supra note 4, at 45.
STOLEN ART
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
the sale of the property to the extent that "an honest and reasonably
prudent purchaser"' 183 would have doubted the seller's ability to con-
vey property rights. 84 If the plaintiff is successful in overcoming this
presumption, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove his good
faith. 18 5 In establishing good faith, the purchaser is required to show
that he "took steps to inquire into the seller's capacity to convey the
property rights and that such steps reasonably resolved such
doubt."' 86
In Elicofon the court also discussed the application of foreign
law, in this case the law of Germany, and subsequently dismissed its
application. Elicofon argued that under German law he had acquired
title. 87 The German law that would have applied is known as the
Ersitzung doctrine. This doctrine awards title to a holder who for ten
years has uninterrupted good faith possession."' Most European na-
tions have a statute of limitations of three to ten years after which
the person in possession cannot be charged with stealing. 89 After
thirty years the owner of the stolen property loses his claim to own-
ership. 190 In the United States, an owner can lose his claim to prop-
erty if he does not exercise due diligence in seeking to recover it.' 91
Most states' statutes of limitations will not accrue unless the owner
fails to assert his right to the property within a reasonable time.' 92
The country that has caused the most concern for owners of
stolen art is Japan. The Japanese, especially in recent years, have
invested considerably in Western art.'93 This desire to invest is cou-
pled with a two year statute of limitations on stolen art, provided the
Japanese purchaser did not know it had been stolen;194 this makes
Japan a favorable market for thieves to sell their stolen art.'95
183. Autocephalous v. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1400 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. (footnote omitted).
187. Kunstsammulungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1160 (2nd Cir. 1982).
Under German law, (1) A person who has a movable thing in his proprietary possession for ten
years acquires ownership (usucaption). (2) Usucaption is excluded if the acquirer is not in
good faith in obtaining possession or if he subsequently learns that he is not entitled to owner-
ship. BGB 937 (W. Ger.).
188. Kunstsammulungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1160 (2nd Cir. 1982).
189. B. BURNHAM, supra note 4, at 45.
190. Id. at 47.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 153-71.
192. Id.
193. A Lucrative Crime Grows Into a Costly Epidemic, N.Y. Times, March 20, 1990,
at C20, col. 3 [hereinafter A Lucrative Crime].
194. MINPO, art. 193. The Japanese Civil Code also provides that the injured party
cannot reclaim stolen property unless he first reimburses the good faith purchaser. MINPO, art.
194.
195. "In 1988, some paintings by Corot that were stolen in France were recovered in
Japan, and we keep hearing rumors that the Monet ["Impression, Sunrise", the painting that
gave the Impressionist Movement its name] is in Japan." A Lucrative Crime, supra note 193,
at C20.
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B. Other Foreign Controls
The primary purpose of foreign law that controls stolen art con-
cerns the protection of cultural property and the prevention of illicit
art traffic leaving the country. 196 Many countries list and classify
their cultural property in an official compilation. France began to
classify "all historical buildings and art treasures" in 1965.19" The
exportation of a classified item is prohibited. If an item is not classi-
fied, the French government can refuse to allow it to be exported and
can require that it remain within the country.1 98 The French govern-
ment can also purchase the item for its national collection within six
months of any application for exportation.' 99
Great Britain also employs such power in purchasing objects
that have been denied an export license. This applies to all art, how-
ever, regardless of national origin. The criteria upon which the Re-
viewing Committee on the Export of Works of Art of the Depart-
ment of Education and Science decides whether to grant an export
license are "whether the object is so closely connected with British
History and national life that its departure would be a misfortune,
[and/or] whether it is of outstanding aesthetic importance, [and]
whether it is of outstanding significance for the study of some partic-
ular branch of art, learning, or history. 2 00
Italy also reserves the right to purchase any cultural property
within two months of the proposed export. 20 1 The definition of cul-
tural property is nearly all movable and immovable objects of "artis-
tic, archaeological, or ethnographic interest to the country. 20 2
VII. Conclusion
Goldberg stands as an example to future victims of art theft and
196. Fishman & Metzger, supra note 7, at 59.
197. Id. at 60. See also "Hungarian Decree No. 9 of 1963 on the Protection of Museum
Pieces requires registration by an official inventory of all material, documents, and monuments
of outstanding importance to the archaeological, historical, natural, artistic, ethnographic, sci-
entific, economic, or technical heritage of the country, or to its economic, social, and cultural
development." Id. at 60-61.
198. Id. at 60.
199. B. BURNHAM, HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION: THE PROTECTION OF CUL-
TURAL PROPERTY 34-35 (1974).
200. Fishman & Metzger, supra note 7, at 63-4.
201. Id. at 62. Italy is perhaps the most plundered of all European nations since it con-
tains "more than half of the world's cultural holdings." The Italian Cabernini recorded
"244,403 paintings, statutes, frescoes, coins and other items ... stolen . . . from 1970
through 1989." Half of the art objects have been recovered. Italy Fears that its Art Treasures
will Scatter in a Unified Europe, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1990, at I, col. 4. Experts point to a
lackadaisical attitude as a major cause of the high number of thefts since Italy "count[s] on a
new art treasure's turning up to take the place of one that has disappeared." Id. at C13, col. 2.
202. Fishman & Metzger, supra note 7, at 62. The unification of Europe in 1992 may
result in the increased movement of stolen art within Europe since trade barriers and customs
guards will vanish. N.Y. Times, supra note 187, at Al, col. 3.
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subsequent purchasers of stolen art. Cyprus followed methodical
steps to insure that, absent concealment, the people who would be
contacted when the mosaics resurfaced were made aware that they
and the church were the true owners. Therefore, within six months
of the mosaics' appearance in Indianapolis, the Cypriot Ambassador
was informed of their whereabouts. Goldberg, however, did not fol-
low such steps in insuring that she could and would obtain good title
to the mosaics. Her recklessness toward the safeguards that could
have protected her from purchasing stolen art may have very well
destroyed her professionally as well as financially.
By encouraging due diligence on both sides, the stolen art mar-
ket will shrink, increasing the difficulty for a thief to unload the
piece and profit from the theft. As with any market of goods, once
demand falls so does the production. In a corollary to this, the theft
of artwork should decrease. Goldberg sends a strong message to buy-
ers with United States connections that cognizable receivership of
stolen art will not be tolerated and will make buyers think twice
before purchasing a questionable piece of art.
Meredith Van Pelt
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